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river warr ch II

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river warr ch II

مُساهمة من طرف cnoc في السبت أبريل 02, 2011 6:23 am

CHAPTER II: THE FATE OF THE ENVOY



All great movements, every vigorous impulse that a community
may feel, become perverted and distorted as time passes, and the
atmosphere of the earth seems fatal to the noble aspirations of
its peoples. A wide humanitarian sympathy in a nation easily
degenerates into hysteria. A military spirit tends towards brutality.
Liberty leads to licence, restraint to tyranny. The pride of race is
distended to blustering arrogance. The fear of God produces bigotry
and superstition. There appears no exception to the mournful rule,
and the best efforts of men, however glorious their early results,
have dismal endings, like plants which shoot and bud and put forth
beautiful flowers, and then grow rank and coarse and are withered by
the winter. It is only when we reflect that the decay gives birth to
fresh life, and that new enthusiasms spring up to take the places of
those that die, as the acorn is nourished by the dead leaves of the oak,
the hope strengthens that the rise and fall of men and their movements
are only the changing foliage of the ever-growing tree of life, while
underneath a greater evolution goes on continually.

The movement which Mohammed Ahmed created did not escape the common
fate of human enterprise; nor was it long before the warm generous blood
of a patriotic and religious revolt congealed into the dark clot of
a military empire. With the expulsion or destruction of the foreign
officials, soldiers, and traders, the racial element began to subside.
The reason for its existence was removed. With the increasing disorders
the social agitation dwindled; for communism pre-supposes wealth, and the
wealth of the Soudan was greatly diminished. There remained only the
fanatical fury which the belief in the divine mission of the Mahdi
had excited; and as the necessity for a leader passed away, the belief
in his sanctity grew weaker. But meanwhile a new force was making itself
felt on the character of the revolt. The triumph no less than the plunder
which had rewarded the Mahdi's victories had called into existence a
military spirit distinct from the warlike passions of the
tribesmen--the spirit of the professional soldier.

The siege of Khartoum was carried on while this new influence
was taking the place of the original forces of revolt. There was
a period when a neutral point was obtained and the Mahdist power
languished. But the invasion of the Eastern Soudan by the British troops
in the spring and the necessary advance of the relieving columns in the
winter of 1884 revived the patriotic element. The tribes who had made
a great effort to free themselves from foreign domination saw in the
operations of Sir Gerald Graham and Lord Wolseley an attempt to bring
them again under the yoke. The impulse which was given to the Mahdi's
cause was sufficient to raise a fierce opposition to the invading forces.
The delay in the despatch of the relief expedition had sealed the fate
of Khartoum, and the fall of the town established the supremacy of
the military spirit on which the Dervish Empire was afterwards founded.

All the warlike operations of Mohammedan peoples are characterised
by fanaticism, but with this general reservation it may be said--that the
Arabs who destroyed Yusef, who assaulted El Obeid, who annihilated Hicks
fought in the glory of religious zeal; that the Arabs who opposed Graham,
Earle, and Stewart fought in defence of the soil; and that the Arabs who
were conquered by Kitchener fought in the pride of an army. Fanatics
charged at Shekan; patriots at Abu Klea; warriors at Omdurman.

In order to describe conveniently the changing character of the revolt,
I have anticipated the story and must revert to a period when the social
and racial influences were already weakening and the military spirit
was not yet grown strong. If the defeat of Yusef Pasha decided the whole
people of the Soudan to rise in arms and strike for their liberties,
the defeat of Hicks satisfied the British Government that those liberties
were won. The powerful influence of the desire to rule prompted
the Khedive's Ministers to make still further efforts to preserve their
country's possessions. Had Egypt been left to herself, other desperate
efforts would have been made. But the British Government had finally
abandoned the policy of non-interference with Egyptian action in the
Soudan. They 'advised' its abandonment. The protests of Sherif Pasha
provoked Lord Granville to explain the meaning of the word 'advice.'
The Khedive bowed to superior authority. The Minister resigned.
The policy of evacuation was firmly adopted. 'Let us,' said the
Ministers, 'collect the garrisons and come away.' It was simple to decide
on the course to be pursued, but almost impossible to follow it. Several
of the Egyptian garrisons, as in Darfur and El Obeid, had already fallen.
The others were either besieged, like Sennar, Tokar, and Sinkat,
or cut off from the north, as in the case of the Equatorial Province,
by the area of rebellion. The capital of the Soudan was, however, as yet
unmolested; and as its Egyptian population exceeded the aggregate of the
provincial towns, the first task of the Egyptian Government was obvious.

Mr. Gladstone's Administration had repressed the revolt of Arabi Pasha.
Through their policy the British were in armed occupation of Egypt.
British officers were reorganising the army. A British official supervised
the finances. A British plenipotentiary 'advised' the re-established
Tewfik. A British fleet lay attentive before the ruins of Alexandria,
and it was evident that Great Britain could annex the country in name
as well as in fact. But Imperialism was not the object of the Radical
Cabinet. Their aim was philanthropic and disinterested. As they were now
determined that the Egyptians should evacuate the Soudan, so they
had always been resolved that the British should evacuate Egypt.

Throughout this chapter it will be seen that the desire to get out
of the country at once is the keynote of the British policy. Every act,
whether of war or administration, is intended to be final. Every despatch
is directed to breaking the connection between the two countries
and winding up the severed strings. But responsibilities which had been
lightly assumed clung like the shirt of Nessus. The ordinary practice
of civilised nations demanded that some attempt should be made to justify
interference by reorganisation. The British Government watched therefore
with anxious solicitude the efforts of Egypt to evacuate the Soudan
and bring the garrisons safely home. They utterly declined to assist
with military force, but they were generous with their advice. Everybody
at that time distrusted the capacities of the Egyptians, and it was
thought the evacuation might be accomplished if it were entrusted to
stronger and more honest men than were bred by the banks of the Nile.
The Ministers looked about them, wondering how they could assist the
Egyptian Government without risk or expense to themselves, and in an
evil hour for their fame and fortunes someone whispered the word 'Gordon.'
Forthwith they proceeded to telegraph to Cairo: 'Would General Charles
Gordon be of any use to you or to the Egyptian Government; and, if so,
in what capacity'? The Egyptian Government replied through Sir Evelyn
Baring that as the movement in the Soudan was partly religious they were
'very much averse' from the appointment of a Christian in high command.
The eyes of all those who possessed local knowledge were turned to
a different person. There was one man who might stem the tide of Mahdism,
who might perhaps restore the falling dominion of Egypt, who might at
least save the garrisons of the Soudan. In their necessity and distress
the Khedivial advisers and the British plenipotentiary looked
as a desperate remedy to the man whose liberty they had curtailed,
whose property they had confiscated, and whose son they
had executed--Zubehr Pasha.

This was the agent for whom the Government of Egypt hankered.
The idea was supported by all who were acquainted with the local
conditions. A week after Sir Evelyn Baring had declined General Gordon's
services he wrote: 'Whatever may be Zubehr's faults, he is said to be
a man of great energy and resolution. The Egyptian Government considers
that his services may be very useful. . . . Baker Pasha is anxious to
avail himself of Zubehr Pasha's services.'[Sir Evelyn Baring, letter of
December 9, 1883.] It is certain that had the Egyptian Government been
a free agent, Zubehr would have been sent to the Soudan as its Sultan,
and assisted by arms, money, and perhaps by men, to make head against
the Mahdi. It is probable that at this particular period the Mahdi would
have collapsed before a man whose fame was nearly equal to, and whose
resources would have been much greater than, his own. But the British
Ministry would countenance no dealings with such a man. They scouted the
idea of Zubehr, and by so doing increased their obligation to suggest
an alternative. Zubehr being rejected, Gordon remained. It is scarcely
possible to conceive a greater contrast than that which these two men
presented. It was a leap from the Equator to the North Pole.

When difficulties and dangers perplex all minds, it has often
happened in history that many men by different lines of thought arrive
at the same conclusion. No complete record has yet been published
of the telegrams which passed between the Government and their agent
at this juncture. The Blue-books preserve a disingenuous discretion.
But it is known that from the very first Sir Evelyn Baring was bitterly
opposed to General Gordon's appointment. No personal friendship existed
between them, and the Administrator dreaded the return to the feverish
complications of Egyptian politics of the man who had always been
identified with unrest, improvisation, and disturbance. The pressure was,
however, too strong for him to withstand. Nubar Pasha, the Foreign Office,
the British public, everyone clamoured for the appointment. Had Baring
refused to give way, it is probable that he would have been overruled.
At length he yielded, and, as soon as his consent had been obtained,
the government turned with delight to Gordon. On the 17th of January
Lord Wolseley requested him to come to England. On the 18th he met
the Cabinet. That same night he started on the long journey
from which he was never to return.

Gordon embarked on his mission in high spirits, sustained by
that belief in personality which too often misleads great men and
beautiful women. It was, he said, the greatest honour ever conferred
upon him. Everything smiled. The nation was delighted. The Ministers
were intensely relieved. The most unbounded confidence was reposed
in the envoy. His interview with the Khedive was 'very satisfactory.'
His complete authority was proclaimed to all the notables and natives
of the Soudan [Proclamation of the Khedive, January 26, 1884.] He was
assured of the support of the Egyptian Government [Sir E. Baring to
Major-General Gordon, January 25, 1884.] The London Foreign Office,
having with becoming modesty admitted that they had not 'sufficient
local knowledge,' [Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, January 22, 1884.]
accorded him 'widest discretionary power.' [Sir E. Baring to Earl
Granville, February 1, 1884.] One hundred thousand pounds was placed
to his credit, and he was informed that further sums would be supplied
when this was exhausted. He was assured that no effort would be wanting
on the part of the Cairene authorities, whether English or Egyptian,
to afford him all the support and co-operation in their power
[Sir E. Baring to Major-General Gordon, January 25, 1884.] 'There is
no sort of difference,' wrote Sir Evelyn Baring, 'between General
Gordon's views and those entertained by Nubar Pasha and myself.'
[Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville, February 1,1884.] Under these
propitious auguries the dismal and disastrous enterprise began.

His task, though difficult and, as it ultimately proved, impossible,
was clearly defined. 'You will bear in mind,' wrote Sir Evelyn Baring,
'that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan.'
'The object. . . of your mission to the Soudan,' declared the Khedive,
'is to carry into execution the evacuation of those territories and to
withdraw our troops, civil officials, and such of the inhabitants . . .
as may wish to leave for Egypt. . . and after the evacuation to take the
necessary steps for establishing an organised Government in the different
provinces.' Nor was he himself under any misconception. He drew up a
memorandum when on board the Tanjore in which he fully acquiesced in
the evacuation of the Soudan. In a sentence which breathes the same
spirit as Mr. Gladstone's famous expression, 'a people rightly struggling
to be free,' he wrote: 'I must say that it would be an iniquity to
conquer these peoples and then hand them back to the Egyptians without
guarantees of future good government.' Finally, he unhesitatingly
asserted: 'No one who has ever lived in the Soudan can escape the
reflection "What a useless possession is this land!"' And Colonel Stewart,
who accompanied him and endorsed the memorandum, added: 'And what a huge
encumbrance to Egypt!' Thus far there was complete agreement
between the British envoy and the Liberal Cabinet.

It is beyond the scope of these pages to describe his long ride
across the desert from Korosko to Abu Hamed, his interview with the
notables at Berber, or his proclamation of the abandonment of the Soudan,
which some affirm to have been an important cause of his ruin.
On the 22nd of February he arrived at Khartoum. He was received with
rejoicing by the whole population. They recognised again their just
Governor-General and their present deliverer. Those who had been about
to fly for the north took fresh heart. They believed that behind the
figure of the envoy stood the resources of an Empire. The Mahdi and the
gathering Dervishes were perplexed and alarmed. Confusion and hesitancy
disturbed their councils and delayed their movements. Gordon had come.
The armies would follow. Both friends and foes were deceived. The great
man was at Khartoum, but there he would remain--alone.

Whatever confidence the General had felt in the power of his personal
influence had been dispelled on the journey to Khartoum. He had no more
illusions. His experienced eye reviewed the whole situation. He saw
himself confronted with a tremendous racial movement. The people of
the Soudan had risen against foreigners. His only troops were Soudanese.
He was himself a foreigner. Foremost among the leaders of the revolt
were the Arab slave dealers, furious at the attempted suppression of
their trade. No one, not even Sir Samuel Baker, had tried harder to
suppress it than Gordon. Lastly, the whole movement had assumed a
fanatical character. Islam marched against the infidel. Gordon was a
Christian. His own soldiers were under the spell they were to try to
destroy. To them their commander was accursed. Every influence was
hostile, and in particular hostile to his person. The combined forces
of race, class, and religion were against him. He bowed before their
irresistible strength. On the very day of his arrival at Khartoum,
while the townsfolk were cheering his name in the streets and the
batteries were firing joyful salutes, while the people of England thought
his mission already accomplished and the Government congratulated
themselves on the wisdom of their action, General Gordon sat himself
down and telegraphed a formal request to Cairo for Zubehr Pasha.

The whole story of his relations with Zubehr is extremely characteristic.
Zubehr's son, Suliman, had been executed, if not by Gordon's orders,
at least during his administration of the Soudan and with his complete
approval. 'Thus,' he had said, 'does God make gaps in the ranks of His
enemies.' He had hardly started from London on his new mission, when he
telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring, telling him that Zubehr was a most
dangerous man and requesting that he might be at once deported to Cyprus.
This was, of course, quite beyond the powers or intention of the British
Agent. The General arrived in Cairo like a whirlwind close behind his
telegram, and was very angry to hear that Zubehr was still in Egypt.
Before starting up the river he went to see Sherif Pasha. In the
ex-Minister's ante-room he met the very man he had determined to avoid
--Zubehr. He greeted him with effusion. They had a long talk about
the Soudan, after which Gordon hurried to the Agency and informed
Sir Evelyn Baring that Zubehr must accompany him to Khartoum at once.
Baring was amazed. He did not himself disapprove of the plan. He had,
in fact, already recommended it. But he thought the change in Gordon's
attitude too sudden to be relied on. To-morrow he might change again.
He begged the General to think more seriously of the matter. Gordon with
his usual frankness admitted that his change of mind had been very sudden.
He had been conscious, he said, of a 'mystic feeling' that Zubehr was
necessary to save the situation in the Soudan.

Gordon left Cairo still considering the matter. So soon as he made
his formal demand from Khartoum for the assistance of Zubehr it was
evident that his belief in the old slave dealer's usefulness was a sound
conviction and not a mere passing caprice. Besides, he had now become
'the man on the spot,' and as such his words carried double force.
Sir Evelyn Baring determined to support the recommendation with his whole
influence. Never was so good a case made out for the appointment of
so bad a man. The Envoy Extraordinary asked for him; Colonel Stewart,
his colleague, concurred; the British Agent strongly urged the request;
the Egyptian Government were unanimous; and behind all these were ranged
every single person who had the slightest acquaintance with the Soudan.
nothing could exceed the vigour with which the demand was made.
On the 1st of March General Gordon telegraphed: 'I tell you plainly,
it is impossible to get Cairo employees out of Khartoum unless the
Government helps in the way I told you. They refuse Zubehr . . . .
but it was the only chance.' And again on the 8th: 'If you do not
send Zubehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away.'
'I believe,' said Sir Evelyn Baring in support of these telegrams,
'that General Gordon is quite right when he says that Zubehr Pasha is
the only possible man. Nubar is strongly in favour of him. Dr. Bohndorf,
the African traveller, fully confirms what General Gordon says of the
influence of Zubehr.' The Pasha was vile, but indispensable.

Her Majesty's Government refused absolutely to have anything to do
with Zubehr. They declined to allow the Egyptian Government to employ him.
They would not entertain the proposal, and scarcely consented to
discuss it. The historians of the future may occupy their leisure and
exercise their wits in deciding whether the Ministers and the people were
right or wrong; whether they had a right to indulge their sensitiveness
at so terrible a cost; whether they were not more nice than wise; whether
their dignity was more offended by what was incurred or by what
was avoided.

General Gordon has explained his views very clearly and concisely:
'Had Zubehr Pasha been sent up when I asked for him, Berber would in all
probability never have fallen, and one might have made a Soudan Government
in opposition to the Mahdi. We choose to refuse his coming up because of
his antecedents in re slave trade; granted that we had reason, yet, as we
take no precautions as to the future of these lands with respect to the
slave trade, the above opposition seems absurd. I will not send up 'A'
because he will do this, but I will leave the country to 'B', who will do
exactly the same [Major-General Gordon, JOURNALS AT KHARTOUM.]

But if the justice of the decision is doubtful, its consequences were
obvious. Either the British Government were concerned with the Soudan,
or they were not. If they were not, then they had no reason or right to
prohibit the appointment of Zubehr. If they were, they were bound to see
that the garrisons were rescued. It was an open question whether Great
Britain was originally responsible for the safety of the garrisons.
General Gordon contended that we were bound to save them at all costs,
and he backed his belief with his life. Others may hold that Governments
have no right to lay, or at any rate must be very judicious in the laying
of burdens on the backs of their own countrymen in order that they may
indulge a refined sense of chivalry towards foreigners. England had not
misgoverned the Soudan, had not raised the revolt or planted the
garrisons. All that Egypt had a right to expect was commiseration.
But the moment Zubehr was prohibited the situation was changed.
The refusal to permit his employment was tantamount to an admission that
affairs in the Soudan involved the honour of England as well as the honour
of Egypt. When the British people--for this was not merely the act of the
Government--adopted a high moral attitude with regard to Zubehr, they
bound themselves to rescue the garrisons, peaceably if possible,
forcibly if necessary.

With their refusal to allow Zubehr to go to the Soudan
began the long and miserable disagreement between the Government
and their envoy. Puzzled and disturbed at the reception accorded to his
first request, Gordon cast about for other expedients. He had already
stated that Zubehr was 'the only chance.' But it is the duty of
subordinates to suggest other courses when those they recommend are
rejected; and with a whole-hearted enthusiasm and unreserved loyalty
the General threw himself into the affair and proposed plan after plan
with apparent hope.

Gordon considered that he was personally pledged to effect the evacuation
of Khartoum by the garrison and civil servants. He had appointed some
of the inhabitants to positions of trust, thus compromising them with
the Mahdi. Others had undoubtedly been encouraged to delay their departure
by his arrival. He therefore considered that his honour was involved in
their safety. Henceforward he was inflexible. Neither rewards nor threats
could move him. Nothing that men could offer would induce him to leave
Khartoum till its inhabitants were rescued. The Government on their side
were equally stubborn. Nothing, however sacred, should induce them to send
troops to Khartoum, or in any way involve themselves in the middle
of Africa. The town might fall; the garrison might be slaughtered;
their envoy--But what possibilities they were prepared to face as
regards him will not be known until all of this and the next generation
are buried and forgotten.

The deadlock was complete. To some men the Foreign Office might
have suggested lines of retreat, covered by the highest official praise,
and leading to preferment and reward. Others would have welcomed an order
to leave so perilous a post. But the man they had sent was the one man
of all others who was beyond their control, who cared nothing for what
they could give or take away. So events dragged on their wretched course.
Gordon's proposals became more and more impracticable as the best courses
he could devise were successively vetoed by the Government, and as his
irritation and disappointment increased. The editor of his Journals has
enumerated them with indignant care. He had asked for Zubehr. Zubehr was
refused. He had requested Turkish troops. Turkish troops were refused.
He had asked for Mohammedan regiments from India. The Government regretted
their inability to comply. He asked for a Firman from the Sultan to
strengthen his position. It was 'peremptorily refused.' He proposed to go
south in his steamers to Equatoria. The Government forbade him to proceed
beyond Khartoum. He asked that 200 British troops might be sent to Berber.
They were refused. He begged that a few might be sent to Assuan. None were
sent. He proposed to visit the Mahdi himself and try to arrange matters
with him personally. Perhaps he recognised a kindred spirit.
The Government in this case very naturally forbade him.

At last the quarrel is open. He makes no effort to conceal his disgust.
'I leave you,' he says, the 'indelible disgrace of abandoning the
garrisons.' [Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring (telegraphic), received
at Cairo April 16.] Such abandonment is, he declares, 'the climax of
meanness.' [Ibid, despatched April 8.] He reiterates his determination
to abide with the garrison of Khartoum. 'I will not leave these people
after all they have gone through.' [Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring,
Khartoum, July 30; received at Cairo October 15.] He tosses his commission
contemptuously from him: 'I would also ask her Majesty's Government to
accept the resignation of my commission.' [Major-General Gordon to Sir E.
Baring (telegraphic), Khartoum, March 9.] The Government 'trust that he
will not resign,' [Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, Foreign Office,
March 13.] and his offer remains in abeyance. Finally, in bitterness and
vexation, thinking himself abandoned and disavowed, he appeals to Sir
Evelyn Baring personally: 'I feel sure, whatever you may feel
diplomatically, I have your support--and that of every man professing
himself a gentleman--in private'; [Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring
(telegraphic), received at Cairo April 16.] and as a last hope he begs
Sir Samuel Baker to appeal to 'British and American millionaires'
to subscribe two hundred thousand pounds to enable him to carry out the
evacuation without, and even in spite of, the Governments of Cairo and
London; and Sir Samuel Baker writes a long letter to the Times in
passionate protest and entreaty.

Such are the chief features in the wretched business. Even the Blue-books
in their dry recital arouse in the reader painful and indignant emotions.
But meanwhile other and still more stirring events were passing outside
the world of paper and ink.

The arrival of Gordon at Khartoum had seriously perplexed and alarmed
Mohammed Ahmed and his Khalifas. Their following was discouraged,
and they themselves feared lest the General should be the herald
of armies. His Berber proclamation reassured them, and as the weeks
passed without reinforcements arriving, the Mahdi and Abdullah,
with that courage which in several great emergencies drew them to the
boldest courses, determined to put a brave face on the matter and blockade
Khartoum itself. They were assisted in this enterprise by a revival of
the patriotic impulse throughout the country and a consequent stimulus
to the revolt. To discover the cause it is necessary to look to the
Eastern Soudan, where the next tragedy, after the defeat of Hicks,
is laid.

The Hadendoa tribe, infuriated by oppression and misgovernment,
had joined the rebellion under the leadership of the celebrated,
and perhaps immortal, Osman Digna. The Egyptian garrisons of Tokar and
Sinkat were beleaguered and hard pressed. Her Majesty's Government
disclaimed all responsibility. Yet, since these towns were not far from
the coast, they did not prohibit an attempt on the part of the Egyptian
Government to rescue the besieged soldiers. Accordingly an Egyptian
force 3,500 strong marched from Suakin in February 1884 to relieve Tokar,
under the command of General Baker, once the gallant colonel of the
1Oth Hussars. Hard by the wells of Teb they were, on the 5th of February,
attacked by about a thousand Arabs.

'On the square being only threatened by a small force of
the enemy. . . the Egyptian troops threw down their arms and ran,
carrying away the black troops with them, and allowing themselves
to be killed without the slightest resistance.' [General Baker to Sir
E. Baring, February 6 (official despatch), telegraphic.] The British and
European officers in vain endeavoured to rally them. The single Soudanese
battalion fired impartially on friend and foe. The general, with that
unshaken courage and high military skill which had already on the Danube
gained him a continental reputation, collected some fifteen hundred men,
mostly unarmed, and so returned to Suakin. Ninety-six officers and
2,250 men were killed. Krupp guns, machine guns, rifles, and a large
supply of ammunition fell to the victorious Arabs. Success inflamed their
ardour to the point of madness. The attack of the towns was pressed with
redoubled vigour. The garrison of Sinkat, 800 strong, sallied out and
attempted to fight their way to Suakin. The garrison of Tokar surrendered.
Both were destroyed.

The evil was done. The slaughter was complete. Yet the British Government
resolved to add to it. The garrisons they had refused to rescue they now
determined to avenge. In spite of their philanthropic professions,
and in spite of the advice of General Gordon, who felt that his position
at Khartoum would be still further compromised by operations on his only
line of retreat [Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville, Cairo, February 23.],
a considerable military expedition consisting of one cavalry and two
infantry brigades, was sent to Suakin. The command was entrusted to
General Graham. Troops were hurriedly concentrated. The 10th Hussars,
returning from India, were stopped and mounted on the horses of the
gendarmerie. With admirable celerity the force took the field. Within
a month of the defeat at Teb they engaged the enemy almost on the very
scene of the disaster. On the 4th of March they slew 3,000 Hadendoa
and drove the rest in disorder from the ground. Four weeks later a second
action was fought at Tamai. Again the success of the British troops was
complete; again the slaughter of the Arabs was enormous. But neither
victory was bloodless. El Teb cost 24 officers and 168 men; Tamai,
13 officers and 208 men. The effect of these operations was the dispersal
of Osman Digna's gathering. That astute man, not for the first
or last time, made a good retreat.

Ten thousand men had thus been killed in the space of three months
in the Eastern Soudan. By the discipline of their armies the Government
were triumphant. The tribes of the Red Sea shore cowered before them.
But as they fought without reason, so they conquered without profit.

As soon as Gordon had been finally refused the assistance of
Zubehr Pasha, it was evident that the rescue of the garrisons

for the rest pls go to www.gutenberg.org

cnoc

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معاينة صفحة البيانات الشخصي للعضو

الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل

رد: river warr ch II

مُساهمة من طرف أولاد سـعيد ود النضيف في السبت نوفمبر 19, 2011 8:58 am

[center]

.It will worth a try for sure up to the last long Chapter
:


أولاد سـعيد ود النضيف

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معاينة صفحة البيانات الشخصي للعضو

الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل

رد: river warr ch II

مُساهمة من طرف جبريل خميس محمد في الإثنين ديسمبر 05, 2011 1:40 am

thanks alot 4 u ,itis nice source and avery interesting way to increase our income in english memory,again thank u indeed.
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جبريل خميس محمد
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تاريخ التسجيل : 22/05/2011
العمر : 40
الموقع : السعودية-الطائف

معاينة صفحة البيانات الشخصي للعضو

الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل

استعرض الموضوع السابق استعرض الموضوع التالي الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة


 
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